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Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a 
state from proving criminal charges with 
evidence discovered during an inventory 
search. In reaching its decision, the Court 
found the facts of the case to be controlled 
by principles governing inventory searches 
of automobiles and of an arrestee's personal 
effects as set forth in South Dakota v. Op-
perman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)and 11/inoisv. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), rather than 
searches of closed trunks and suitcases con-
ducted solely for the purpose of investigat-
ing criminal conduct. Chadwick, Sanders. 
Inventory searches are not subject to the 
warrant requirement because they are con-
ducted by the government as part of a com-
munity caretaking function, totally divorced 
from the detection, investigation or acqui-
sition of evidence relating to the violation 
of a criminal statute. Cady v. Dombrowski~ 
413 U.S. 433 (1973). Moreover, neither 
the policies behind the warrant require-
ment nor the concept of probable cause are 
implicated in an inventory search because 
they relate to the detection, investigation 
and acquisition of evidence in a criminal 
procedure. Since no claim was made in 
Bertine that procedures instituted were a 
subterfuge for a criminal investigation, the 
Court's analysis centered upon the reason-
ableness of the routine caretaking functions. 
In order to justify an intrusion on a con-
stitutionally protected right, governmental 
and societal interests must outweigh the 
protected right. Automobile inventory 
searches have been recognized as a means 
of: ( 1) the protection of the owner's prop-
erty while it remains in police custody; 
(2) the protection of the police against 
claims or disputes over lost or stolen prop-
erty and (3) the protection of police from 
potential danger. 475 U.S. at __ , 107 
S.Ct. at 741. 
In Bertine, Chief] ustice Rehnquist found 
that strong governmental interests are 
served by protecting an owner's property 
while the property is in police custody and 
insuring against lost or stolen property. 
Further, the police who were acting in ac-
cordance with standard caretaking proce-
dures did not act in bad faith. 475 U.S. at 
__ , 107 S.Ct. at 742. In his dissent, 
Justice Marshall contended that the search 
was unconstitutional because department 
regulations gave police discretion to choose 
between impounding the van or parking 
and locking it in a public place. But ac-
cording to the majority, the exercise of 
discretion was exercised according to stan-
dardized criteria on the basis of something 
other than suspicion of criminal conduct. 
The dissent, as well as the Supreme Court 
of Colorado, expressed the view that the 
police, before investigating a container, 
should weigh the strength of an individual's 
privacy interest against the possibility that 
the container might serve as a repository 
for valuable items. In addition, the dissent 
maintained that Bertine's expectation of 
privacy in his backpack and its contents out-
weighed the governmental interests since 
the intrusive search had gone into an inti-
mate area of personal affairs. The Court 
rejected these contentions, stating that a 
single function standard is essential to 
guide police officers who have only lim-
ited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the societal and individual inter-
ests evidenced in the specific circumstances 
they confront. See New York v. Belton, 
453 u.s. 454 (1981). 
This case distinguishes constitutional 
inventory searches from unconstitutional 
ones. Bertine also indicates that inventory 
searches will be valid so long as they are 
conducted according to standardized pro-
cedures and on the basis of something other 
than the suspicion of criminal activity. 
Bertine follows a trend of other Supreme 
Court decisions which hold that the legiti-
mate governmental interests outweigh in-
dividual Fourth Amendment interests. 
- William J. Morrison 
California Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n. v. Guerra, Director, 
Department of Fair Employment 
and Housing: STATE MANDATED 
BENEFITS FOR PREGNANT 
EMPLOYEES HELD NOT 
DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
TITLE Vll 
The United States Supreme Court has 
upheld a California state statute which re-
quires employers to provide female employ-
ees unpaid pregnancy leave of up to four 
months. The employer's original action in 
the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California challenged the 
validity of the statute with respect to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. The court granted 
the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment, stating that the California statute was 
pre-empted by Title VII and was there-
fore "inoperative under the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution." 
33 EPD ,34,227, 34 FEP Cases 562 (1984). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, based on a finding 
that the California statute was neither in-
consistent with nor unlawful under Title 
VII. Rather, the court found the statute 
furthered the goal of equal employment 
opportunity for women. California Federal 
Savings & LoanAss'n. v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 
390 (1985). The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, and in a 6-to-3 decision affirmed 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
Lillian Garland, a receptionist at a Los 
Angeles based savings and loan, lost her 
job after taking three months' pregnancy 
leave. Garland filed a complaint with the 
Department of Fair Employment and 
Housing, which charged the bank with 
violating § 12945(b)(2) of the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T 
CODE ANN.§ l2900et seq. Section 12945 
(b)(2) requires an employer to grant an em-
ployee leave for a reasonable period of time 
on account of pregnancy. The Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission had 
construed this section as providing preg-
nant workers a qualified right to be rein-
stated to the position they held prior to 
their absence. Before the scheduled hear-
ing took place, however, the bank, joined 
by the California Chamber of Commerce 
and a local trade union (both represented 
numerous employers throughout the State 
of California), filed this action in district 
court seeking a declaration that§ 12945(b) 
(2) is inconsistent with and preempted by 
Title VII, and an injunction against its en-
forcement. Title VII prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for 
petitioners, but the court of appeals re-
versed. Justice White delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
In concurring with the decision on ap-
peal, Justice Marshall first discussed 
whether the California statute was pre-
empted by Title VII. There are three ways 
in which federal law may supersede state 
law: in express terms; by inference where 
there is no room for supplementary state 
regulation; and when state law conflicts 
with federal law. The Court dismissed the 
first and second alternatives as inap-
plicable to the situation at hand, but con-
cluded that the third basis for preemption 
was at issue in the case herein. Sections 
708 and 1104 are the two sections of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act which the majority 
analyzed with respect to preemption. Be-
cause both sections provide a liberal con-
struction concerning state regulation of 
employment discrimination, the Court 
concluded that Congress recognized the 
importance attached to state antidiscrim-
ination laws and in no way intended to dis-
place them. Therefore, it was held that § 
12945(b)(2) is not pre-empted by Title VII. 
The Court next discussed the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which amended Title 
VII with respect to the definition of sex 
discrimination. The Act specifies that sex 
discrimination includes discrimination on 
the basis of pregnancy. The petitioners 
argued that the California statute provides 
"special treatment" for pregnant employees, 
and is therefore rejected by the language 
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of the PDA. With support from business 
groups and the Reagan administration, 
petitioners claimed that the PDA requires 
pregnant workers to be treated the same as, 
but not better than, workers with other 
disabilities. Based on the legislative history 
behind the enactment of the PDA, the 
Court agreed with the court of appeals' 
conclusion that its purpose is to provide 
"a floor beneath which pregnancy disabil-
ity benefits may not drop-not a ceiling 
above which they may not rise." Guerra, 
758 F.2d at 396. The 1978 amendment was 
passed specifically to overturn a 1976 Su-
preme Court decision in General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 ( 1976) which 
had held that discrimination on the basis 
of pregnancy was not sex discrimination 
under Title VII. The Court further expli-
cated that Congress intended the Act "to 
provide relief for working women and 
to end discrimination against pregnant 
workers," and that had Congress intended 
to prohibit preferential treatment, it could 
have expressly done so within the PDA 
itself. In support of this latter conclusion, 
the Court noted similar state statutes in 
force at the time the PDA was enacted, and 
the House and Senate reports which sug-
gested that these laws would continue in 
effect under the Act. Finally, the Court 
found that§ 12945(b)(2) of the California 
statute is not inconsistent with the PDA 
because both "achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities and remove barriers 
that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group ... of employees over 
other employees." 474 U.S. __ (1986), 
citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
u.s. 424, 429-430 (1971). 
The last part of petitioners' claim stated 
that § 12945(b)(2) requires employers to 
violate Title VII because they cannot com-
ply with both the federal and state law. The 
Court was quick to invalidate this argu-
ment, stating that the California statute 
merely establishes benefits that employers 
must provide to pregnant workers, and 
that it does not prevent employers from 
giving comparable benefits to other dis-
abled employees. In sum, the Court de-
nied petitioners' facial challenge to§ 12945 
(b)(2), ruling that the special benefits pro-
vided by the statute as construed by the 
Fair Employment and Housing Commis-
sion do not violate federal civil rights laws. 
"By taking pregnancy into account," Jus-
tice Marshall said, "California's pregnancy 
disability leave statute allows women, as 
well as men, to have families without los-
ing their jobs." 474 U.S. __ (1986). 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White 
felt that the California statute was "in 
square conflict" with the federal law be-
cause it requires "every employer to have a 
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disability leave policy for pregnancy even 
if it has none for any other disability." 
Therefore, the state statute is pre-empted 
by the federal law. In pointing to the plain 
language of the PDA, Justice White wrote 
that it clearly mandates equal treatment 
for employees, including pregnant workers, 
and that it does not intend pregnancy to be 
in a class by itself within Title VII. Fur-
ther, the minority felt that the Court's in-
terpretation of the PDA with respect to the 
state statute places an unfair burden on Cal-
ifornia employers by requiring them to im-
plement new minimum disability leave 
programs to satisfy both the state and fed-
eral laws. 
The effect of this decision on other state 
statutes is clear. While not mandating the 
type of preferential treatment afforded in 
California, the holding in Guerra evidences 
the Court's willingness to uphold similar 
statutes in the future as non-violative of 
discrimination laws. Those states which 
decide to enact preferential treatment 
statutes may find that they discourage em-
ployers from hiring women. 
Maryland has included pregnancy in its 
fair employment practices laws, but not to 
the same extent as California. Article 49B, 
§ 17 of the Annotated Code of Maryland 
could not be construed as requiring the 
"special treatment" involved in Guerra. 
The statut~ merely calls for equal treat-
ment with respect to pregnancy, stating 
that any insurance or sick leave plan "shall 
be applied to disability due to pregnancy 
or childbirth on the same terms and condi-
tions as they are applied to other tempo-
rary disabilities subject to the provisions 
of this section." (Emphasis added). 
-Barbara E. Wixon 
Chase v. State: LEON"GOOD 
FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
EXTENDED TO PROBATION 
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS. 
In a case of first impression, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland in Chase v. 
State, 68 Md. App. 413, 511 A.2d 1128 
(1986) ruled that generally, the exclusionary 
rule may not be applied to probation revo-
cation proceedings. In so holding, the 
court of special appeals has followed the 
trend of a majority of other jurisdictions. 
Appellant Jerome Edwin Chase was 
convicted of robbery by the Circuit Court 
for Prince George's County. His sentence 
was suspended in favor of five years pro-
bation. Two years later, after he had al-
ready been cited and resentenced for pro-
bation violations, Chase was arrested and 
charged with intent to distribute mari-
juana and simple possession. While the 
criminal case was pending, the State filed a 
petition to revoke Chase's probation; alleg-
ing a failure to "obey all laws." At the trial 
for the criminal charges, the trial court 
found the Appellant's arrest to be without 
probable cause and suppressed the evidence 
recovered from him at the arrest. Two 
months later, the State dismissed the crim-
inal charges. However, the petition to re-
voke Chase's probation was not dismissed. 
At his probation revocation hearing, Ap-
pellant moved {based on the exclusionary 
rule) to have the evidence seized at the 
time of his arrest suppressed, or have the 
proceeding dismissed. The court, in deny-
ing Chase's motion applied a balancing 
test and determined that "the probation 
process and community safety interests far 
outweigh any deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule." In light of their finding, the 
lower court therein ruled that the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply to probation re-
vocation proceedings. 
In dealing with this case of first impres-
sion, the court of special appeals traced the 
chronological history of the exclusionary 
rule at the Supreme Court level from Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) to the 
present. Judge Wilner, writing for the ma-
jority, noted that even before Mapp v. 
Ohio, 364 U.S. 643 (1961), [which over-
turned Wolf v. Colorado, when it held that 
"all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, 
by that same authority, inadmissible in a 
state court;" Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643], "the 
[Supreme] Court has viewed the exclu-
sionary rule as a deterrent rather than a 
redressive measure", Chase, 68 Md. App. 
at 419, 511 A.2d 1128. Atthe end of their 
historical analysis, the court herein recog-
nized the fact that the balancing test [ es-
tablished in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 894 
( 1984)] "remains an integral part of the 
decisional law in this area." Chase at 420, 
511 A.2d 1128. In Leon, the Supreme Court 
actually retracted the exclusionary rule by 
withdrawing its application to evidence 
obtained in reasonable reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate 
which was later found to be unsupported 
by probable cause. The deterrent effect of 
the exclusionary rule on the police would 
be insignificant and is greatly outweighed 
by its detrimental effect on criminal prose-
cutions. 
In their analysis of Maryland case law on 
the application of the exclusionary rule, 
the court of special appeals looked to 
Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 
632 (1981), where the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland adopted the ruling of U.S. v. 
Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.) cere. denied 
429 U.S. 894 (1976) and declined to ex-
tend the exclusionary rule to sentencing 
